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HARRIS v. ALABAMA
115 S. Ct. 1031 (1995)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
On May 6, 1988, a Montgomery County, Alabama grand jury
indicted Louise Harris, charging her with two counts of capital murder
in the shooting death of her husband, Deputy Sheriff Isaiah Harris.1 Mrs.
Harris had asked her lover, Lorenzo McCarter, to find someone to kill her
husband. McCarterhad found two willing accomplices, Michael Sockwell
and Alex Hood, who were paid one hundred dollars with a promise of
more money upon completion of the killing.
On July 13, 1989, a jury convicted Harris of capital murder for
pecuniary gain or pursuant to a contract for hire. At the sentencing
hearing,2 a number of witnesses attested to Harris' good background and
strong character. 3 The jury recommended by a seven to five vote that
Harris be imprisoned for life without parole.4 The trial judge then
considered Harris' sentence 5 and found the existence of one aggravating
circumstance, that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain. The
trial judge also found one statutory mitigator that Harris had no prior
criminal record. The trial judge also found as a nonstatutory mitigator
that Harris was a hardworking and respected member of her church and
community.
Recognizing that Harris had planned the crime, financed its com-
mission, and stood to benefit the most from her husband's murder,
6 the
trial judge concluded that the one statutory aggravating circumstance far
outweighed all of the non-statutory mitigating circumstances, and im-
posed a sentence of death.
7
1 Harris was originally charged with two counts of murder in the
single killing, one for murder pursuant to a contract for hire or pecuniary
gain, Ala. Code § 13A-5-40(a)(7) (1994), and another for the murder of
a law enforcement officer, Ala. Code § 13A-5-40(a)(5) (1994). The
second count was dismissed, however, because the state failed to prove
Mr. Harris had been on duty at the time of the shooting.
2 A defendant convicted of capital murder in Alabama is entitled to
a sentencing hearing before the trial jury, Ala. Code § 13A-5-46 (1994),
unless jury participation is waived by both parties and approved by the
court, § 13A-5-44 (c).
3 Ala. Code § 13A-5-45 (e) requires that the state prove statutory
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt and subsection (g)
requires the state to disprove, by a preponderance of the evidence, any
mitigating circumstances the defendant may offer.
4 In rendering an advisory verdict, the jury must recommend death
if it finds that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circum-
stances. Otherwise, the verdict is life imprisonment withoutparole. Ala.
Code § 13A-5-46 (e)(3) (1994). The jury may recommend death only if
tenjurors so agree, while a verdict of life imprisonment requires a simple
majority. Ala. Code § 13A-5-46(f). The recommendation and vote tally
are reported to the judge.
5 In order to impose a sentence, thejudge must consider all available
evidence and file a written statement detailing the defendant's crime,
listing specific aggravating and mitigating factors. Alabama Code
§ 13A-5-47(e) provides:
In deciding upon the sentence, the trial court shall determine
whether the aggravating circumstances it finds to exist out-
weigh the mitigating circumstances it finds to exist, and in
doing so the trial court shall consider the recommendation of
The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Harris' convic-
tion and sentence.8 It stated that Alabama's death penalty statute is based
on Florida's sentencing scheme, which the United States Supreme Court
found to be constitutionally acceptable in Spaziano v. Florida9 and
Proffitt v. Florida. 10 The mostbasic difference between the two schemes
is that jury recommendations are to be given "great weight" by the
sentencing judge in Florida,11 whereas Alabama only requires the judge
to "consider" the advisory verdict. The Court of Criminal Appeals
rejected Harris' contention that Florida's standard is constitutionally
required.
12
As required by statute, 13 the court then reviewed the record for
prejudicial errors and independently weighed the aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances. Finding no errors and concluding that death was
the proper sentence, the court affirmed the trial court's decision. 14 The
Alabama Supreme Court affirmed, discussing an unrelated claim. 15 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 16 to decide whether
Alabama's capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional because it does
not specify the weight the judge must give to the jury's recommendation
and thus permits the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.
HOLDING
In a seven to one decision, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court, holding that the
Constitution permits the trial judge, acting alone, to impose a capital
the jury contained in its advisory verdict, unless such a verdict
has been waived pursuant to Section 13A-5-46(a) or 13A-5-
46(g). While the jury's recommendation concerning sentence
shall be given consideration, it is not binding upon the court.
6 Harris would have shared about $250,000 in death benefits with
her co-conspirators.
7 In separate proceedings, all the conspirators were convicted of
capital murder. McCarter and Hood received prison terms of life without
parole. Sockwell, the triggerman, was sentenced to death after the trial
judge rejected ajury recommendation of seven to five for life imprison-
ment.
8 632 So.2d 503 (Ala. 1992).
9 468 U.S. 447, 457-67 (1984) (no constitutional right to be
sentenced by jury).
10 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976) (Florida statute, including provision
allowing override of life recommendation, is constitutional.).
11 See Tedderv. State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975).
12 Harris, 632 So.2d at 538.
13 According to Alabama Code § 13A-5-53(b), if a defendant is
sentenced to death in Alabama, his conviction and sentence are automati-
cally reviewed by an appellate court and, if affirmed, a writ of certiorari
is granted by the Alabama Supreme Court as a matter of right. In addition
to reviewing the record for errors, the appellate courts must indepen-
dently weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances and determine
whether the death sentence is disproportionate to sentences rendered in
comparable cases.
14 632 So.2d at 542-43.
15 632 So.2d 543 (1993).
16 114 S. Ct. 2736 (1994).
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sentence, and the Eighth Amendment does not require states to define the
weight the sentencing judge must give to an advisory jury verdict.
17
Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit death sen-
tences that rest on the basis of arbitrary procedures. In Gardner v.
Florida,18 the Court stated that "[lt is of vital importance to the
defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death
sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice ... "
Later, inGodfreyv. Georgia19 it was held that states have a constitutional
responsibility to tailor and apply the law in a manner that avoids the
arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty.
In addressing Harris' Eighth Amendment claim, the Courtbeganby
highlighting the similarities and differences between Alabama's capital
sentencing scheme and Florida's.20 The most important difference
between the two schemes is that Florida requires that the trial judge give
"great weight" to the jury's recommendation and may not override the
advisory verdict of life unless "the facts suggesting a sentence of death
[are] so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could
differ."21 The Alabama capital sentencing statute, in contrast, requires
only that the trial judge "consider" the jury's recommendation, and
Alabama courts have steadfastly refused to read the Florida standard into
the statute.
22
Concluding that the Eighth Amendment does not require the sen-
tencing judge to ascribe any particular weight to the verdict of an
advisory jury, the Court relied heavily on Spaziano v. Florida,23 where
it upheld the constitutionality of Florida's capital sentencing statute. In
Spaziano the Court addressed the issue of whether Florida could vest
sentencing authority in thejudge andrelegate thejury to an advisory role.
In rejecting the contention that placing sentencing responsibility on a
trial judge in a capital case violates contemporary standards of fairness
and decency, the Court held that the "Eighth Amendment is not violated
every time a State reaches a conclusion different from a majority of its
sisters over how best to administer its criminal laws." 24 In making this
determination, the "hallmark of the analysis" is not the particular weight
a state chooses to place upon the jury's advice, but whether the scheme
adequately channels the sentencer's discretion so as to prevent arbitrary
results.25
Based onFranklin v. Lynaugh,26 the Court rejected Harris' conten-
tion that the trial judge must give "great weight" to the jury's advice. In
Franklin the Court had rejected the argument that specific methods for
17 115 S. Ct. 1036-37 (1995).
18 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977).
19 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980).
20 Both states require jury participation in the sentencing process
but give ultimate sentencing authority to the trial judge. Ala. Code
§ 13A-5-47(e) (1994); Fla. Stat. § 921.141(3) (1985). A sentence of
death in both states is subject to automatic appellate review. Ala. Code
§ 13A-5-55 (1994); FlaStat. § 921.141(4) (1985). Finally, inFloridaand
Alabama the reviewing courts must independently weigh aggravating
and mitigating circumstances to determine the propriety of the death
sentence, Ala. Code § 13A-5-53(b)(2) (1994); Harvard v. State, 375
So.2d 833 (Fla. 1977), and must decide whether the penalty is excessive
or disproportionate compared to similar cases. Ala. Code § 13A-5-
53(b)(3) (1994); Williams v. State, 437 So.2d 133 (Fla. 1983).
21 115 S. Ct. at 1034 (quoting Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d at 910).
The same standard applies to a jury recommendation of death. See
Grossman v. State, 525 So.2d 833, 899 n.1 (Fla. 1988).
balancing mitigating and aggravating factors in a capital sentencing
proceeding were constitutionally required.27 Similarly, the Constitution
does not require a state to ascribe any specific weight to aggravating or
mitigating standards.28 Therefore, to require that "great weight" be
given to jury recommendations in Alabama would "offend these estab-
lishedprinciples and place within constitutional ambit micromanagement
tasks that properly rest within the State's discretion to administer its
criminal justice system." 29
In support of the "great weight" standard, Harris argued alterna-
tively that, underAlabama law, thejury verdictis more than advisory and
that the jury in fact enjoys the key sentencing role, subject only to review
by the judge. Harris cited numerous cases where death sentences were
reversed due to prejudicial errors committed before the advisory jury.
From these cases she reasoned that unless the jury played a key role in
sentencing, reversal would not have been required because the sentenc-
ing judge was not exposed to the same harmful error.
The Court rejected this argument, stating that "reversal is proper so
long as thejury recommendation played a role in thejudge's decision, not
necessarily a determinative one."30 This is so because if the judge must
consider the jury verdict in sentencing a capital defendant, then it follows
that a sentence is invalid if the recommendation upon which it is partially
based was rendered erroneously. 31 Such consequential error attaches
whenever the jury recommendation is considered in the process, not only
when it is given great weight by the judge.
According to the Alabama Prison Project, there have been only five
cases in which the judge rejected an advisory jury verdict of death,
whereas there have been forty-seven instances where the judge imposed
a death sentence over ajury recommendation of life. 32 Harris used this
disparity to argue that Alabama trial courts, in imposing death sentences,
use erratic methods and apply whimsical standards in assessing the
function of the jury's advisory verdict.
The Court did not find the numbers convincing, stating that they
afforded at best an incomplete picture of capital sentencing in Alabama.
She reasoned that even if the statistics did supply an accurate portrayal
of capital sentencing, constitutional questions involve more than mere
numerical tabulation. The true test is whether the penalties imposed are
the product of properly guided discretion and not arbitrary whim.
Harris' last argument focused on disparities in the weight given to
jury verdicts in different cases in Alabama. For example, the trial judge
in Harris' case did not specify his reason for rejecting thejury's sentence
of life withoutparole, but in another case he wrote that he accorded "great
weight" to the jury's recommendation.33 Harris pointed to other cases
with similar disparities and argued that the Alabama statute, in permit-
22 See Ex Parte Jones, 456 So.2d 380, 382-83 (Ala. 1984).
23 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
24 Id. at 464-65.
25 115 S. Ct. at 1035.
26 487 U.S. 164 (1988).
27 Id. at 179.
28 See Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1990);
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-15 (1982).
29 115 S. Ct. at 1036.
30 Id.
31 SeeEspinosa v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2926 (1992), where the Court
reversed a death sentence when an advisory jury, but not the sentencing
judge, was presented with an invalid aggravating factor.
32 115 S. Ct. at 1036.
33 115 S. Ct. at 1036-37, citing State v. Coral, No. CC-88-741
(Montgomery Cty., June 26, 1992).
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ting judges to arbitrarily reject advisory jury verdicts, is an abuse of
sentencing discretion.
The Court rejected this argument, reasoning that the cited state-
ments do not indicate that the judges have divergent understandings of
the statutory requirement. Rather, they illustrate how different judges
have "considered" the jury's advice. It would be unreasonable to expect
that advisory verdicts would be treated uniformly in every case.
34
The result in Harris is not surprising, given the Court's holding in
Spaziano that states could, consistent with the Eighth Amendment, vest
sentencing authority in the judge and relegate the jury to an advisory
role.35 However, Justice O'Connor's statement that constitutional
questions involve more than mere numerical tabulation is questionable.
She has previously counted legislatures in determining the reach of the
Eighth Amendment,3 6 purportedly following the established doctrine
that the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress ofa maturing society,"'37 and
34 115 S. Ct. at 1037.
35 Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 464-65.
36 SeeThompsonv. Oklahoma,487U.S. 815,849 (1988) ("[A]lmost
two-thirds of the state legislatures have definitely concluded that no 15-
year-old should be exposed to the threat of execution.") (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) and Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989) ('The
clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is
the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures. We have also
looked to data concerning the actions of sentencing juries.").
37 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
38 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,293 (1976) (jury
determinations and legislative enactments are two crucial indicators of
evolving standards of decency) and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
179-181 (1976) ("The legislatures of at least 35 States have enacted new
that both legislatures and juries are primary indicators of these stan-
dards.
38
The Court's decision in Harris has no direct application to Virginia
practice, as a jury sentence of life imprisonment is not reviewable in
Virginia. 39 However, after consideration of a post-sentence report and
upon good cause shown, 40 a judge may set aside a jury's sentence of
death and impose a sentence of life imprisonment.
41
While Virginia courts rarely override jury death sentences, the post-
sentencing hearing provides an opportunity for counsel to ensure that the
record is adequate to preserve appellate issues. It also allows counsel to
make and preserve new claims, one being that the Sixth Amendment
confrontation clause is violated by the sentencing court's consideration
of hearsay evidence contained in the post-sentence report.
42
Summary and analysis by:
John M. DelPrete
statutes that provide for the death penalty .... The jury also is a
significant and reliable objective index of contemporary values ....
This pivotal role of juries was simply not discussed in Harris.
39 Va.CodeAnn. § 19.2-264.4 (A) (1990) ("In cases oftrial byjury,
where a sentence of death is not recommended, the defendant shall be
sentenced to imprisonment for life.").
40 "Good cause shown" reiterates the rule applicable in all cases
when the court must consider altering a jury verdict. See Bassett v.
Commonwealth, 222 Va. 844,284 S.E.2d 844 (1981).
41 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.5 (1990).
42 Hearsay evidence contained in the post-sentence report can be
considered by the court at the sentencing phase. See O'Dell v. Common-
wealth, 234 Va. 672,364 S.E.2d 491 (1988).
STOCKTON v. MURRAY
41 F.3d 920 (4th Cir. 1994)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
In 1983, Dennis Stockton was convicted, as a hiree, of the capital
murder of Kenneth Ardner and sentenced to death under the murder for
hire provision of Virginia's capital murder statute. 1 Under this section,
one is not guilty of capital murder unless the hiring element is proved.
The only witness wlio testified to the hiring agreement was Randy
Bowman, an inmate at a North Carolina prison at the time of trial.2
Bowman testified that he had not received any promises for testifying,
but that it was the right thing to do and that he hoped to benefit from it.
3
Stockton pursued appeals and collateral proceedings, was awarded
a resentencing hearing which resulted in another death sentence, and
continued to seek appellate relief.4
I Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(b) (1990).
2 A full description of the underlying facts can be found in Stockton
v. Commonwealth, 852 F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom.
3 Stockton v. Murray, 41 F.3d 920, 922 (4th Cir. 1994).
4 Id. at 923.
5 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that due process is violated when
material and exculpatory evidence is withheld from defendant).
The issues decided by the Fourth Circuit panel and included in
Stockton's fourth state habeas corpus petition involve claimed violations
of Brady v. Maryland5 and its progeny. Specifically, Stockton alleged
that (1) he was unaware, until defense counsel received a letter from the
Commonwealth's attorney in 1990, that the prosecutor had promised
Bowman that he (the prosecutor) would endeavor to get Bowman
transferred to another prison; and (2) that the prosecutor failed to turn
over a 1983 letter from Bowman in which Bowman threatened the
prosecutor that he would not testify unless the sentence he was serving
was reduced.
6
The Virginia courts found these claims to be procedurally barred
and the federal district court concurred in this finding. Stockton appealed
to the Fourth Circuit.
6 Stockton, 41 F.3d at 923. Another claim involved an allegation
that the prosecution withheld evidence that a second witness at Stockton's
trial, who alleged that Stockton had committed a second murder, had
mentioned an additional motive Stockton allegedly harbored for killing
Ardner. The claim was relatively unimportant compared to Stockton's
two other Brady claims, and the court's rejection of the claim was
probably correct. It will not be discussed further in this summary.
